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Abstract
This article investigates the effect of the relaxation of the rigidity of employment
protection legislation in dual economies on qualification mismatch, measured
as the sum of over-education and under-education. Using a unique matched
employer–employee flow dataset, the effect of two reforms, which significantly
modified the rules for the utilization of temporary contracts in Italy, is studied.
By increasing the relative flow of workers on short-term contracts, the short-
term contract reform is found to have reduced the relative flow of over-educated
workers. However, this result holds only for older male workers, while no effect
is found for female and younger workers. The apprenticeship reform instead had
no major effects on the relative flow of mismatched workers.
1. Introduction
Mismatched workers in OECD countries account for approximately 25
percent of the total workforce (CEDEFOP 2014). Mismatch is particularly
severe in Mediterranean countries, which are characterized by more
segmented labour markets (European Commission 2013). In these ‘dual
economies’ (Saint-Paul 2002), labour market flexibility has been introduced at
the margin, with the creation of two tiers. In the upper tier, workers who are
usually hired on open-ended contracts characterized by stringent employment
legislation (EPL) enjoy higher wages and good benefits. In the lower tier
workers are typically hired on low-EPL temporary contracts and experience
lower wages, higher turnover and job insecurity (Cahuc et al. 2016; Dolado
et al. 2002). In this context, the role of temporary contracts in affecting
mismatch is ambiguous. On one side, temporary contracts are used by new
entrants in the labour market as a stepping stone, while still searching for
better matches (Groot 1996; Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink 2000): the
so-called ‘waiting room effect’ (Dekker et al. 2002). Even though data show
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FIGURE 1
EPL Index Associated with Temporary Contracts and Share of Temporary Employees. [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Source: OECD.
that approximately 23 per cent of UK graduates (McGuinness and Sloane
2011) and 20 per cent of Italian graduates (Iammarino andMarinelli 2015) at
their first job experience are over-educated, this is a temporary phenomenon,
as the increased flexibility facilitates job-to-job transitions and provides scope
for improving the quality of the matches. On the other side, temporary jobs
serve as an instrument to integrate into the labour market weaker segments of
the populations, with lower productivity and bargaining power. These workers
are more willing to take up temporary jobs which demand lower qualifications
than the ones they possess, because they are happy to find a job after searching
for a long time. Over-education in this segment of the labour market is a
more persistent phenomenon due to the assumed ‘dead-end’ character of these
contracts, which may be strengthened by the stigmatization of these workers
(Dekker et al. 2002).
This article investigates the way the reform of two types of temporary
contracts in Italy during the early 2000s affected qualification mismatch.
The focus is on the Italian region Veneto for a number of reasons. First,
the implementation of several labour market reforms in Italy (1997, 2001
and 2003) reduced the average EPL strictness of temporary contracts
(Figure 1(a)). As a result, the share of temporary contracts increased
significantly (Figure 1(b)). Second, Italy is among the OECD countries with
the highest rates of mismatch (Verhaest and van der Velden 2013) and ranks
number 1 for under-education (McGowan and Andrews 2015). Third, Veneto
is one of the leading Italian industrial regional economies: in 2016, the
nominal GDP accounted for 9.25 per cent of the Italian GDP, the GDP
per capita was approximately equal to 111 per cent of the EU average
(European Commission 2019) and the highly specialized manufacturing base
(see the online Appendix) makes its economy comparable to the German one
(Devicienti et al. 2019).
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To pursue this objective, the longitudinal dataset PLANET, which provides
information on the universe of workers’ flows in the private sector in Veneto,
is merged with the AIDA dataset, which provides firms’ balance sheets
information. Due to its longitudinal feature, the time period covered (1998–
2011) and the detailed information on workers’ education and occupation, the
final dataset is unique.
Workers are defined as mismatched if their level of education is higher
(or lower) compared to the mode of workers in the same age group, within
the same occupation who enter the market in a specific year. A difference-in-
differences model is proposed, in which two institutional reforms occurred in
2001 and 2003 are analysed to study the way qualification mismatch among
temporary workers has changed after the reforms. The 2001 reform liberalized
the utilization of short-term contracts, but its actual implementation had to
wait for the approval of collective bargaining, which took place in different
sectors at different times. The 2003 reform, which modified a number of
features of the apprenticeship contract in terms of eligibility, duration,
minimum wage and training content, required regional governments or
industry-specific collective agreements to issue implementation guidelines,
and therefore, the actual implementation happened in different regions
and sectors at different times. The identification strategy is borrowed from
Cappellari et al. (2012), and the variation in the implementation of the two
reforms is exploited to identify their effects on workers’ mismatch.
The results show that the short-term contract reform had a significant
positive effect on the relative flow of workers hired on short-term contracts,
which lead to a significant reduction of the relative flow of over-educated
workers. These findings suggest that by enabling workers to escape from
relatively poor matches and by providing tools to firms to substitute workers
with different skills, the short-term contract reform has been effective in
improving the quality of the matches. However, these results are short-term
and hold only for older male workers, while there is no evidence of beneficial
effects among women and younger workers. Although the apprenticeship
reform introduced multiple changes to the regulations of the apprenticeship
contract, which could have affected the flow of mismatched workers, no
significant effect is found neither in terms of over-education, nor in terms
of under-education.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
relationship between EPL rigidity andmismatch, while Section 3 describes the
Italian institutional background, while Section 4 illustrates the methodology.
Section 5 describes the data, Section 6 explains the validity of the approach
and Section 7 illustrates the results. Finally, Section 8 concludes the article.
2. Literature review
In the literature, there is no clear-cut evidence on the relationship between the
rigidity of EPL andmismatch. Di Pietro (2002) discusses a number of reasons
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why rigidmarkets with stringent EPL are expected to be associatedwith higher
mismatch. First, stringent EPL on the firing of permanent workers makes it
more difficult for firms to adapt their workforce to shocks and to address
gaps between the demand and supply of skills. Hence, less stringent EPL
reduces mismatch by decreasing the waiting time until workers get a better
match. Second, firing restrictions may prevent firms from immediately taking
advantage of upward changes in skilled workforce availability, discouraging
them from adopting new technologies and reducing the number of vacancies
that can be filled with high-skilled workers. Third, rigid EPL tends to lock
highly educated workers into relatively poor matches by making it more
difficult for them to obtain a new position, leading indirectly to a higher
incidence of over-education by pushing the economy towards a ‘low-skill, low-
technology trap’. In an influential work, Lazear (1998) shows that when firms
face barriers to laying off due to legal or other institutional impediments (e.g.
powerful trade unions), the relative value of risky workers, whose productivity
is unknown, is reduced, with negative effects on the average quality of the
workers. Brunello et al. (2007) also argue that as more rigid EPL makes
it harder for individuals to obtain their first job and for firms to reduce
staff, the use of temporary contracts may help reduce mismatch. Sicherman
(1991) states that, under a strict EPL regime, firms face longer employment
relationships and, if experience complements education, employers prefer to
hire highly educated young workers without experience to allow for future
internal promotions, thus increasing the share of over-educated workers
(Croce and Ghignoni 2012). On a different perspective, Gangl (2004) claims
that stringent EPL countries may experience lower over-education because
employers may be more risk-adverse in recruiting, with positive effects on the
quality of the matches.
Empirically, Ortiz (2010) finds a positive correlation between being hired on
a temporary contract and being over-educated. Daly et al. (2000), Verhaest
and van der Velden (2013) and Croce and Ghignoni (2012) fail to find a
significant correlation between EPL andmismatch. Davia et al. (2017) instead
find that countries with more rigid EPL are associated with lower shares of
over-educated workers.
Another related strand of the literature focuses on the effect of minimum
wage on employment (Neumark and Wascher 2008; Dube et al. 2010),
specifically on teen employment (Allegretto et al. 2017; Giuliano 2013;
Manning 2016; Portugal and Cardoso 2006), which remains a controversial
topic among economists. Although there is no evidence of the direct
effect of minimum wage on qualification mismatch in the literature, by
making the apprenticeship contract more expensive firms might become
more selective when hiring an apprentice, which should lead to the
recruitment of better educated workers. Nevertheless, when minimum wage
is increased, the retention rate of workers is higher (Portugal and Cardoso
2006), and this might lead instead firms to select more under-educated
workers, with the intent of providing specific training (Berton et al.
2017).
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3. Institutional background
The typical labour contract in Italy is the permanent contract, which is
open-ended and associated with stringent employment protection regulations
(EPL). The short-term contract shares all the features of the permanent
contract except for the limited duration and zero firing costs at termination.
A short-term contract can only be renewed once and its total duration
cannot be longer than three years. When hiring a worker on a short-term
contract, employers need to justify why they offer a short-term instead of a
permanent contract, choosing among a list of specific circumstances, such as
the replacement of workers on leave or a sudden increase in production. If
either the length or themotivation is not truly reported, the worker can sue the
employer to get her contract converted to a permanent one. Firms can also use
apprenticeship contracts to hire young workers for a maximum duration of
four years, and are required to provide on-the-job training to be performed by
local authorities or accredited training institutions. At the end of the training
period, the acquired qualifications are asserted by a formal certification. To
compensate for the training costs incurred by the firms, labour costs amount
to one-third of the costs paid for permanent and short-term contracts.
In Italy and in the Veneto region, in 2014, permanent contracts accounted
for approximately 87–88 per cent of total employment, followed by short-
term contracts (7–9 per cent), while apprenticeship contracts accounted for
approximately 1.5–2.5 per cent of total employment.
In the time period considered (1998–2007), two major labour market
reforms were implemented: the short-term contract reform (Law 368/2001)
and the apprenticeship reform (Law 30/2003).
The Short-Term Contract Reform
The 2001 reform (Law 368/2001) introduced a major novelty in the short-
term contract regulation: the possibility to use the contract for any reason
of a technical, organizational, production or replacement nature, largely
broadening the scope for utilization. Because of the strong deregulation of
the short-term contract, this reform was instrumental in establishing a dual
labour market (Boeri 2011).
The relaxation of this rule, however, created confusion among employers
regarding the requirements for adoption (Aimo 2006): it was not clear whether
employers could use short-term contracts also for activities not of temporary
nature. Moreover, in case of court disputes, the applicability relied too much
on the interpretations of the judges, causing delays and high uncertainty on
the potential outcome. The risk incurred by firms of being obliged to convert
short-term contracts in permanent contracts after a court appeal created
strong disincentives for their adoption (Venn 2009). According to the new
legislation, collective bargaining was responsible for setting the maximum
percentage of fixed-term employees in firms’ total employment. For this
reason, to be effective in a given industry, the new law had to wait for
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TABLE 1
Short-Term Contract Reform by Year and Sector
Sector Year
Chemicals, Constructions, Food Products, Printing, 2005
Retail Trade, Textiles, Transportation, Wood Products
Energy, Telecommunication 2006
Real Estate, Water and Gas 2007
Note. The list refers to sectors/years in which the collective agreements have been renewed and
the rules for the new short-term contract approved.
Source: ISFOL (2010) and Consiglio Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL).
the renewal of the specific collective agreements. In practice, all collective
agreements confirmed the maximum share of short-term contracts set in the
previous bargaining rounds, so no differences were introduced by the reform
on employment flexibility across industries.
Nevertheless, only industries with contracts negotiated after the law was
implemented could utilize the new short-term contract. After 2001, the
renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements at sectoral level only
occurred in some industries in 2005, 2006 and 2007 (Table 1). Few sectors of
the economy, such asmetal manufacturing and banking renewed the collective
agreements during the period but postponed the implementation of the ‘new’
short-term contract to a later normative agreement, which took place after
the period considered (see the online Appendix). This variation across sectors
is exploited in the identification strategy.
The Apprenticeship Reform
The 2003 reform (Law 30/2003) significantly modified a number of features of
the apprenticeship contract, in terms of eligibility, duration, minimum wage
and training content. First, the limit for eligibility was raised from 25 to 29
years old; second, the duration of the contract was extended from varying
between 18 months and four years (five in the craft sector) to vary between
two and six years; third, a minimum wage at least two levels below the wage
of a similarly qualified worker (i.e. the position reached by the end of the
contract) was instituted, and finally, the option for firms to supply training at
the workplace as a substitute for external training was established (Albanese
et al. 2017). While the latter was an attempt to tackle the inefficiencies of local
authorities, it also made it harder to monitor compliance.1
The national law was enacted in 2003 and it required regional governments
to issue the necessary regulations concerning the training content of the new
apprenticeship contract. All regions acted slowly, including Veneto, which
issued the regulations in 2009. However, additional institutional variations
in the adoption of the new apprenticeship contract were offered by Law
80/2005, which provided that in the absence of regional regulations, industry-
specific collective agreements could define the rules for the training content of
the apprenticeship contract. Starting from 2005, collective agreements which
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TABLE 2
Apprenticeship Reform by Year and Sector
Sector Year
Banking 2005
Chemicals, Construction, Energy, Food Products, 2006
Metal Manufacturing, Printing, Retail Trade, Textiles,
Transportation, Wood products
Water and Gas, Rubber and Plastic, Tourism, Radio and TV 2007
Note. The listed sectors are the ones in which the specific collective agreements have been renewed
and the new apprenticeship contract has been regulated.
Source: ISFOL (2010) and ISFOL (2007).
enabled the utilization of the new apprenticeship contract were signed in
specific sectors (Table 2). This variation across sectors is exploited in the
identification strategy.
Data show that the share of apprentices among the 15–29 employedworkers
in the Veneto region increased from 16.7 per cent in 2005 to 19.9 per cent in
2007. However, while 16.6 per cent of apprentices were in training in 2005,
only 12.1 per cent were in training in 2007. In addition, the average duration
range marginally increased compared to the period before the reform, with an
average minimum and maximum length across sectors of 33 and 56 months,
respectively (see the online Appendix).
4. Methodology
The goal is to study the effect of the implementation of two labour market
reforms which significantly modified key features of temporary contracts
on mismatch. An employed person may experience two forms of mismatch:
qualification and skills mismatch (see the online Appendix). The focus here
is on qualification mismatch, which refers to a situation in which a person
holds a job whose qualification requirements do not correspond to the level
and/or type of qualification she has (ILO 2018). In the literature, three
different measures of qualification mismatch (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011)
have been proposed: objective (or normative), subjective (self-assessed), and
statistical (Hartog 2000). While the first approach is based on classifications,
which quickly become outdated (Chevalier 2003; ILO 2018), the second
approach heavily relies on the opinion of the respondent and the wording
of the survey question (Alba-Ramirez 1993; Allen and van der Velden 2001;
Chevalier and Lindley 2009;Mavromaras et al. 2010). The statistical measure,
which estimates the level of qualification mismatch by comparing the level of
education attained with the mean (Verdugo and Verdugo 1989) or the modal
(Bauer 2002; Kiker et al. 1997; Mendes de Oliveira et al. 2000) value of the
level of education within each occupational category, is the one used in this
study. The main reason for selecting this approach is the availability of a
unique employer–employee flow dataset, which provides detailed information
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on firms and workers for the period of the reforms. The mode is chosen (over
the mean), like in most of the literature (Battu and Sloane 2004; Chiswick and
Miller 2009; Kampelmann andRycx 2012) as it is themeasure least affected by
the shape of the distribution of education (Mavromaras et al. 2012). To take
into account the dynamic nature of the required education due to changes in
technology and educational quality, cells of individuals are defined according
to age group, occupation and year of entrance in the labour market (Quinn
and Rubb 2006). Workers are mismatched if they are over- (under-) educated,
that is, their level of education is higher (lower) compared to the mode of
workers in the same age group, within the same occupation who enter the
market in a specific year. This definition based on flows rather than on stocks
allows to better capture the evolution of the required education for a specific
type of job over time. Moreover, the focus on flows into and out of temporary
contracts (of limited duration) helps overcome the potential drawback of
this approach of having the occupational mode driven by the majority of
incumbent older workers with longer tenure.
The staggered implementation of the two labour market reforms gives rise
to a quasi-experimental setting in which adopting and non-adopting sectors
within the Veneto region are observed over a sufficient period of time. The
identification strategy borrows from Cappellari et al. (2012) and the model is
specified as follows:
Yj,t = c+ α(SReform) j,t + β(AReform) j,t + γ (SAReform) j,t + ζt + φ j + ε j,t, (1)
where j refers to the firm and t to the time. Four groups of firms are identified:
those not affected by the reforms, those affected only by the first reform,
those affected only by the second reform and those affected by both reforms.
(SReform) j,t is the dummy variable which takes value 1 for firms with an active
business in years and sectors affected only by the short-term contract reform,
(AReform) j,t is the dummy variable which takes value 1 for firms with an active
business in years and sectors affected only by the apprenticeship reform, and
(SAReform) j,t is the dummywhich takes value 1 for firmswith an active business
in years and sectors affected by both reforms.2 All estimates include year
dummies, ζt , which controls for shift in the dependent variable common to
all sectors and firm fixed effects φ j . The coefficients of interest are α, β, and
γ , which can be interpreted as the causal effects of the short-term contract
reform (α), the apprenticeship reform (β) and the combination of both
reforms (γ ) on outcomeY . Data are collapsed at firm level and observations
are weighted by firm size; hence, per each firm, one observation is retained in
each year considered. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
clustered at sector level (Cameron and Miller 2015).
Although in the literature, there is no clear theoretical insight about timing,
the effect on mismatch is expected to be contemporaneous to the reforms.
Given that the workers flows are analysed and the implementation of the
reforms had already been significantly delayed (the lawswere approved in 2001
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and 2003, respectively), it is envisioned that firmswould react promptly to take
advantage of the new rules.
As a first step, the flow of a specific category of workers X is defined as
the difference between the entries and the exits of those workers in firm j at
time t, that is, (Xentriesjt − Xexitsjt ). Second, the effect of the two reforms on the
contribution of the flow of each contract type to the total employment flow
in firm j at time t is computed to investigate whether each reform contributed
to increase proportionally more the utilization of specific types of contracts.
To do so, equation (1) is estimated using as outcomes the ratio of the flows of
short-term contracts and apprenticeships and the total employment flow:
(St-rel) j,t = (Short-termflow) j,t/(Employmentflow) j,t, (2)
(App-rel) j,t = (Apprenticesflow) j,t/(Employmentflow) j,t . (3)
Next, outcomes of interest such as total mismatch and its two components
over- and under-education, computed as the flow of workers in firm j at time
t who are mismatched, over-educated and under-educated respectively, over
the total employment flow are considered:
Mismatch-rel j,t = (Mismatchedflow) j,t/(Employmentflow) j,t, (4)
Over-rel j,t = (Over-educatedflow) j,t/(Employmentflow) j,t, (5)
Under-rel j,t = (Under-educatedflow) j,t/(Employmentflow) j,t . (6)
Since in the literature-specific groups of individuals are found to be more
frequently hired on temporary contracts and more exposed to mismatch
(Dekker et al. 2002; Groot and Maassen Van Den Brink 2000), potential
asymmetric effects are explored. Accordingly, a triple difference-in-differences
estimation is performed, where an additional source of variation is included,
by focusing on the relative flows of specific groups of workers within the
benchmarkmodel (equation (1)). Specifically, gender and age represent a third
dimension along which the treatment varies (Goodman-Bacon 2018), as in the
following model:
Yg, j,t = c+ α(SReform) j,t + β(AReform) j,t + γ (SAReform) j,t + δ(SReform) j,tG
+ λ(AReform) j,tG + θ (SAReform) j,tG + ζtG + G + ζt + φ j + ε j,t, (7)
where G is a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for specific groups of
workers, such as women and young individuals in the age groups 15–24. Data
are collapsed at firm level and category of individuals (by age and gender) and
observations are weighted by firm size. The interest is in the causal effects of
the reforms for the group of workers G on outcomeY , which are represented
by the coefficients (α + δ) for the short-term contract reform, (β + λ) for the
apprenticeship reform and (γ + θ ) for the combination of both reforms. As
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workers eligible to be hired on an apprenticeship contract are those below the
age of 29, an additional analysis is performed by estimating model 1 on a
restricted sample of firms which hire workers in the age group 15–29.
5. Data and descriptive statistics
An employer–employee flow dataset from the Italian Veneto region
(PLANET) is used to perform the analysis. The dataset includes all workers
who experienced a mobility episode, that is, hiring, firing, transformations,
resignations, contract expiration and retirements. Once entered in the panel,
each worker is followed for the entire career, unless she moves outside the
Veneto region.3 A valuable feature of this dataset is the inclusion of detailed
information on occupation (four digits), education (eight categories), different
types of labour contracts and firms’ characteristics, such as industry and
sector (three digits); however, the stock of workers is not observable. The
firms’ national tax number (codice fiscale) is used to merge this dataset with
the AIDA dataset, which provides balance sheets information inferred by the
standardized reports that firms file annually with the Chamber of Commerce.4
This dataset is used to extract information on the firms size and the analysis
is restricted to observations for which the correlation between the flows of
workers in AIDA and in PLANET is approximately 90 per cent. This matched
employer–employee dataset provides all flows of workers into and out of firms
for the period 1998–2007.
Due to the poor reliability of the education level of foreign workers, firms
whose average flows of foreign workers during the period considered are
above 4 per cent (approximately 10 per cent of the firms) are removed from
the sample. The tails of the flows distribution are cut below 1 per cent and
above 99 per cent to avoid extreme values and occupations with less than 50
observations are removed (approximately 0.004 per cent of the total number
of observations). The analysis is focused on individuals between 15 and 64
years old.
In Figure 2, the evolution of the relative flows of temporary workers and
qualification mismatch is reported. An increase in the relative flow of short-
term employees and apprentices is observed in 2005, followed by a decline.
While over-education increases in 2005 and decreases afterwards, under-
education decreases in 2005 and remains stable in 2006 and 2007.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the whole sample of workers and for
the selected sample. Characteristics such as age, education and qualification
mismatch are quite similar between the two groups. Approximately 50 per
cent of individuals in the sample have a junior high school degree and
more than 30 per cent have a high school degree, with only 6 per cent of
individuals having a tertiary level of education. Approximately 30 per cent of
workers are hired on a short-term contract, while approximately 8 per cent are
hired on an apprenticeship contract. Short-term contracts are more common
among women (37 per cent compared to 25 per cent) and older workers.
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FIGURE 2
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows (1998-2007). [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The variables are defined as in equations (2)–(6) and weighted by firm size.
Over-education affects 23 per cent of the sampled individuals, mostly
young males in the 15–24 and 25–34 age groups. Approximately 13 per
cent of the sampled workers are under-educated, mainly females and older
workers.
Two dummy variables which identify the treated and the control groups
are created per each treatment/reform. Exposure to the treatment is defined
based on the sector each firm belongs. Treated firms with respect to the
short-term contract reform are those firms which operate in sectors whose
collective agreements, signed after the implementation of the 2001 law,
passed the new legislation. In a similar fashion, treated firms with respect
to the apprenticeship reform are those firms which operate in sectors, whose
industry-specific collective agreements defined the rules for the training
content of the apprenticeship contract.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics of the firms included in the final
sample. In column 1, the characteristics of all firms are reported; in column
2, the features of the subset of firms not affected by the reforms are shown.
In columns 3 and 4, the characteristics of the subset of firms, which were
exposed to only one of the two reforms are reported, respectively. Finally,
column 5 describes the characteristics of the subset of firms, which were
exposed to both reforms. No firms were subject to any treatment between
1998 and 2004, most firms exposed to the first reform were treated in 2005,
while most firms exposed to the apprenticeship reform were treated in 2006.
The characteristics of the firms are quite similar across groups, except for
a slightly lower employment flow and a slightly higher relative flow of
short-term contracts in firms exposed to the short-term contract reform. In
terms of qualification mismatch, all the variables reported are similar across
groups.
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TABLE 3
Descriptive Statistics — Workers
Selected sample Whole sample
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.363 0.481 0.407 0.491
Age 15–24 0.303 0.460 0.285 0.452
Age 25–34 0.362 0.480 0.366 0.482
Age 35–44 0.209 0.407 0.217 0.412
Age 45–54 0.097 0.296 0.102 0.302
Age 55–64 0.028 0.165 0.029 0.168
No education 0.042 0.201 0.048 0.215
Elementary 0.067 0.250 0.075 0.263
Junior high school 0.509 0.499 0.507 0.491
High school 0.319 0.466 0.304 0.460
Bachelor’s degree 0.060 0.237 0.062 0.241
Postgraduate degree 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.052
PhD 0.0002 0.013 0.0002 0.014
Short term 0.297 0.457 0.342 0.472
Short term (female) 0.372 0.483 0.410 0.491
Short term (male) 0.255 0.436 0.287 0.452
Short term (Age 15–24) 0.230 0.421 0.276 0.447
Short term (Age 25–34) 0.285 0.451 0.319 0.466
Short term (Age 35–44) 0.328 0.469 0.369 0.482
Short term (Age 45–54) 0.419 0.494 0.447 0.497
Short term (Age 55–64) 0.521 0.499 0.549 0.497
Apprenticeship 0.080 0.271 0.063 0.242
Apprenticeship (female) 0.071 0.256 0.055 0.228
Apprenticeship (male) 0.085 0.279 0.067 0.251
Apprenticeship (Age 15–24) 0.252 0.433 0.209 0.407
Apprenticeship (Age 25–34) 0.010 0.097 0.007 0.087
Over-education 0.237 0.426 0.248 0.432
Over-education (female) 0.21 0.415 0.235 0.424
Over-education (male) 0.248 0.431 0.259 0.438
Over-education (Age 15–24) 0.266 0.442 0.282 0.450
Over-education (Age 25–34) 0.258 0.437 0.272 0.445
Over-education (Age 35–44) 0.168 0.374 0.169 0.374
Over-education (Age 45–54) 0.200 0.400 0.218 0.413
Over-education (Age 55–64) 0.222 0.416 0.233 0.423
Under-education 0.132 0.339 0.132 0.339
Under-education (female) 0.143 0.350 0.140 0.347
Under-education (male) 0.125 0.332 0.125 0.331
Under-education (Age 15–24) 0.102 0.302 0.106 0.308
Under-education (Age 25–34) 0.116 0.321 0.115 0.319
Under-education (Age 35–44) 0.158 0.365 0.156 0.362
Under-education (Age 45–54) 0.233 0.423 0.227 0.418
Under-education (Age 55–64) 0.166 0.372 0.145 0.351
No. of observations 614,204 1,731,679
No. of firms 12,823 16,563
Note. Whole sample: all workers, entering and exiting the firms in the merged AIDA-PLANET
dataset. Selected sample: all workers, entering and exiting the selected firms in the final dataset,
where the focus is on the age range 16–64, firms whose average flows of foreign workers during
the period considered is above 4% are removed, the tails of the flows distribution below 1% and
above 99% are cut and occupations with less than 50 observations are removed.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Does Employment Protection Affect Qualification Mismatch? 13
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics — Firms
Full
sample
Never
treated
Short
term Apprenticeship
Both
reforms
No. of firms 12,823 5,314 355 1,914 5,240 5,240
Observations 59,259 45,270 1,950 3,206 8,833 117,646
1998 4,758 4,758 0 0 0 10,442
1999 5,167 5,167 0 0 0 11,385
2000 5,694 5,694 0 0 0 12,330
2001 5,405 5,405 0 0 0 12,466
2002 7,151 7,151 0 0 0 12,421
2003 6,702 6,702 0 0 0 12,255
2004 5,794 5,794 0 0 0 12,061
2005 6,188 2,522 1,943 112 1,611 11,458
2006 6,283 1,180 3 1,461 3,639 11,453
2007 6,117 897 4 1,633 3,583 11,375
Agriculture 0.87 1.14 0 0 0 1.11
Extraction 0.33 0.44 0 0 0 0.29
Manufacturing 48.49 49.50 59.85 88.90 26.15 48.32
Energy 0.12 0.14 0 0.12 0.07 0.15
Construction 7.51 6.66 24.67 0 10.81 7.79
Commerce 27.50 25.16 0 0 55.55 24.98
Hotels and Restaurants 1.71 1.50 0 10.39 0 2.26
Transport and Commun. 4.23 3.71 14.62 0 6.16 4.57
Finance 0.33 0.39 0 0.59 0 0.38
Real estate 6.45 8.27 0 0 0.89 7.33
Public sector 0.02 0.02 0 0 0 0.01
Education 0.21 0.27 0 0 0 0.23
Health 0.72 0.94 0 0 0 0.89
Others 1.51 1.86 0.87 0 0.36 1.65
Firm size 30.86 34.87 43.63 53.32 32.21 45.11
Employment flow 2.59 2.81 1.58 2.65 1.75 3.01
Share of short-term flow 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.12
Share of apprenticeship flow 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08
Share of mismatch flow 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.28
Share of over-education flow 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.16
Share of under-education flow 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.13
Note. Characteristics of firms according to different samples: Column 1 refers to all firms in the
sample; column 2 refers to firms never affected by the reforms (collective agreements not renewed);
column 3 refers to firms affected only by the short-term contract reform (collective agreements
only approved the new short-term contract).
Column 4 refers to firms affected only by the apprenticeship reform (collective agreements only
approved the new apprenticeship contract); column 5 refers to firms affected by both reforms
(collective agreements approved both new contracts).
6. Validity of this approach
The validity of this approach is based on three assumptions: first, the proposed
measure of mismatch is not endogenously affected by the reforms; second, the
evolution of the outcomes of interest in treated and control sectors would not
be different without the reforms; and finally, there is no casual relationship
between the outcomes of interest and the adoption of the reforms.
The proposed definition of mismatch relies on the mode of education being
an accurate measure of the education level within a certain occupation. In
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TABLE 5
Effect of the Reforms on Mean and Mode Levels of Education
Mean Mode Mode
SReform 0.0089 −0.0225 0.0031
(1.06) (−1.14) (0.21)
AReform −0.0120 −0.0098 −0.0130
(−1.04) (−0.64) (−1.23)
SAReform 0.0050 0.0147 0.0068
(0.53) (0.67) (0.47)
N 59,259 59,259 59,259
R2 0.0065 0.0033 0.0049
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variables are: in column 1, the mean of education by occupation and age at firm level;
and in column 2, the mode of education by occupation and age at firm level.
addition, being the mode a time-varying variable, it may be endogenously
affected by the reforms. To rule out the hypothesis that the reforms affected
the mode (mean) of education and, in turn, had an impact on the proposed
measures of mismatch, equation (1) is estimated using as outcomes the mode
and the mean of education computed at firm level (Table 5). The coefficients
of the reforms not significantly different from zero are interpreted as evidence
that the labour market reforms under consideration did not have an impact
on the proposed measure of mismatch. Additionally, a robustness analysis
in which a three-year lagged mode is used, with the advantage of avoiding
measuring the mode during a treatment period, thus ensuring exogeneity of
the treatment, provides results fully consistent with the findings obtained using
the current mode (see the online Appendix).
The validity of the difference-in-differences estimation strategy is also based
on the assumption that the evolution of the outcomes of interest for the
adopting and non-adopting sectors would not be systematically different in
the absence of the intervention. The main concern is indeed that sectors
which adopted first the new contracts are those in which the relative flows of
temporary and mismatched workers were already growing faster, violating the
assumption of parallel trend before the treatment. To address this issue, the
relative flows of short-term workers, apprentices and mismatched workers in
sectors affected and non-affected by the short-term contract reform (Figure 3)
and by the apprenticeship reform (Figure 4) are compared. Panels 3a and
3b compare the relative flows of short-term workers and apprentices in
treated and control sectors with respect to the short-term contract reform.
Panel 3c depicts the relative flow of mismatch in adopting and non-adopting
sectors, while Panels 3d and 3e show the relative flows of over-educated
and under-educated workers, respectively. The same exercise is reported for
firms in treated and control sectors with respect to the apprenticeship reform
(Figure 4). Although the figures reveal a similarity in the trends of the two
series before the reforms, formal placebo tests are provided. The main model
is estimated by including per each reform placebo dummies for the treated in
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FIGURE 3
Relative Short-Term Workers and Apprenticeship Workers Flows and Relative Over-Educated
and Under-Educated Workers Flows in Treated and Control Groups with Respect to the
Short-Term Contract Reform. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Each variable is computed as the ratio with respect to the employment flow, as defined in
equations (2)–(6). The treated group includes all firms in sectors in which the collective agreements
have approved the rules for the new short-term contract.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Industrial Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
16 British Journal of Industrial Relations
FIGURE 4
Relative Short-Term Workers and Apprenticeship Workers Flows and Relative Over-Educated
and Under-Educated Workers Flows in Treated and Control Groups with respect to the
Apprenticeship Reform. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Each variable is computed as the ratio with respect to the employment flow, as defined in
equations (2)–(6). The treated group includes all firms in sectors in which the collective agreements
have approved the rules for the new apprenticeship contract.
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FIGURE 5
Event Study for the Short-Term Contract Reform. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The dependent variable is the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All
regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level.
Regressions are weighted by firm size. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are reported.
the years before and after the reform, where k ∈ {S,A}:
Yj,t = c+
+2∑
p=−5
αp(kReform) j,t+p + ζt + φ j + ε j,t .
Coefficients per each year per each outcome variable, together with the 95
per cent confidence intervals, are reported in Figures 5 and 6. Although some
coefficients turned out to be occasionally different from zero in few years
before the treatments, overall no systematic pattern of pre-trend effects is
found across all variables considered. We also observe a one-year anticipation
effect of the short-term contract reform on the relative share of short-term
employees, which could be ascribable to the firms and workers’ expectations
of the industry collective agreement renewals (Giannelli et al. 2012). Event
studies for the triple difference in differences, accounting for gender and age,
are reported in the online Appendix.
Finally, to demonstrate the exogenous nature of the reforms, the dummies,
which take value 1 for the year in which the reforms were implemented and
0 otherwise, where k ∈ {S,A}, are regressed on the lags of the relative flows
of temporary and mismatched workers (Cappellari et al. 2012), as defined in
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FIGURE 6
Event Study for the Apprenticeship Reform. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The dependent variable is the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All
regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level.
Regressions are weighted by firm size. Ninety-five per cent confidence intervals are reported.
equations (2) and (3) and equations (5) and (6), respectively:
k-Reform j,t = c+
5∑
q=1
St-relt−q + ε j,t, (8)
k-Reform j,t = c+
5∑
q=1
App-relt−q + ε j,t, (9)
k-Reform j,t = c+
5∑
q=1
Over-relt−q + ε j,t, (10)
k-Reform j,t = c+
5∑
q=1
Under-relt−q + ε j,t . (11)
The employment flows are averaged across three-digit sectors and provinces.
If the coefficients of the lag variables happen to be systematically statistically
significant, this may reveal the presence of a causal relationship between
the relative flows of temporary and mismatched workers and the adoption
of the reformed contracts. The results (Tables 6 and 7) show no systematic
relationship between the lags of temporary employment and mismatch
flows and the adoption of the reforms, reassuring about the exogeneity of
the reforms.
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TABLE 6
Trends in Temporary Employment
SReform AReform SReform AReform
Short term t − 1 0.102 0.089 Apprenticeship t − 1 0.139 0.151
(0.70) (0.60) (0.47) (0.51)
Short term t − 2 0.03 −0.004 Apprenticeship t − 2 −0.303 −0.323
(0.01) (−0.02) (−1.09) (−1.19)
Short term t − 3 0.017 0.023 Apprenticeship t − 3 −0.128 −0.155
(0.08) (0.11) (−0.42) (−0.50)
Short term t − 4 0.243 0.208 Apprenticeship t − 4 0.012 −0.028
(1.21) (1.02) (0.04) (−0.10)
Short term t − 5 −0.265 −0.247 Apprenticeship t − 5 0.384 0.367
(−1.10) (−1.01) (1.09) (1.05)
Constant 0.716*** 0.716*** Constant 0.729*** 0.733***
(9.85) (9.83) (12.24) (12.31)
N 1,737 1,737 N 1,737 1,737
R2 0.0234 0.0199 R2 0.0303 0.0325
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses. Significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variable takes value 1 in the year of the reform and 0 otherwise.
TABLE 7
Trends in Over-Education and Under-Education
SReform AReform SReform AReform
Over-education t − 1 0.300 0.308 Under-education t − 1 −0.196 −0.187
(0.98) (1.01) (−0.72) (−0.69)
Over-education t − 2 0.064 0.019 Under-education t − 2 0.019 0.034
(0.19) (0.06) (0.09) (0.15)
Over-education t − 3 0.160 0.162 Under-education t − 3 0.301 0.293
(0.72) (0.73) (1.21) (1.18)
over-education t − 4 −0.073 −0.062 Under-education t − 4 −0.583* −0.572*
(−0.40) (−0.34) (−1.85) (−1.80)
Over-education t − 5 −0.091 −0.072 Under-education t − 5 −0.284 −0.313*
(−0.38) (−0.30) (−0.88) (−0.97)
Constant 0.769*** 0.675*** Constant 0.798*** 0.794***
(8.17) (8.10) (10.38) (10.32)
N 1,737 1,737 N 1,737 1,737
R2 0.0232 0.0218 R2 0.0375 0.0367
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses. Significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
The dependent variable takes value 1 in the year of the reform and 0 otherwise.
7. Results
General Findings
The main findings are reported in Table 8. First, the effect of the reforms
on the relative flows of workers on temporary contracts (columns 1 and 2 of
Table 8), as defined in equations (2) and (3), is shown. If the reforms promoted
the utilization of certain types of temporary contracts, a change in the relative
flow of workers hired on those contracts on the total employment flow is
expected. The relative contribution of short-term contracts to the total flow of
employment is found to be higher by approximately 5 percentage points due to
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TABLE 8
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows
Short term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0497** 0.0023 −0.0573*** −0.0464*** −0.0108
(2.12) (0.22) (−3.12) (−2.71) (−0.70)
AReform 0.0188 −0.0028 0.0192 −0.0002 0.0192
(0.90) (−0.30) (1.28) (−0.00) (1.40)
SAReform −0.0307 −0.0029 0.0222 0.0263 −0.0041
(−1.11) (−0.27) (1.16) (1.37) (−0.23)
Constant 0.1163*** 0.0495*** 0.3031*** 0.1962*** 0.1069***
(6.06) (8.00) (24.03) (13.23) (7.98)
N 59,259 59,259 59,259 59,259 59,259 59259
R2 0.0065 0.0026 0.0026 0.0008 0.0013 0.0008
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All
regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level.
Regressions are weighted by firm size.
the implementation of the short-term contract reform, in line with the results
of Cappellari et al. (2012).5 However, the same reform had no effect on the
relative flow of workers hired on apprenticeship. According to the estimates,
the apprenticeship reform had no significant effect neither on the relative flow
of short-term workers neither on the relative flow of apprentices. Also, in
firms exposed to both reforms, which is an environment of high flexibility,
the relative flow of temporary workers (both short-term and apprentices)
did not change. These results point to the fact that the increased flexibility
brought up by the short-term contract reform, through the extension of the
scope for hiring on a temporary basis, was positively received in the labour
market. As a consequence, the relative flow of workers hired on short-term
contracts increased, with no substitution effects between apprenticeship and
short-term contracts.
Then, the impact of the reforms on the relative flows of mismatched, over-
educated and under-educated workers (columns 3–5 of Table 8), as defined in
equations (4)–(6), is analysed. The short-term contract reform significantly
decreased the relative flow of over-educated workers by approximately 4.6
percentage points, while no effect was found with regard to under-education.
In relation to the apprenticeship reform, no effect on the relative flows of over-
educated and under-educated workers is found. No effect is also found on the
relative flows of over-educated and under-educated workers in firms exposed
to both reforms. These findings suggest that by fostering the diffusion of short-
term contracts, the short-term contract reform was effective in significantly
reducing the relative flow of over-educated workers. This evidence supports
the theory that lifting the restrictions in the utilization of short-term contracts
may facilitate the hiring decisions of firms, increase the number of vacancies
and favour the firms’ adoption of new technologies, leading to better quality
matches (Brunello et al. 2007; Di Pietro 2002). A robustness test, in which
the effect of the reforms is allowed to be time-varying for each year after the
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TABLE 9
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows by Gender
Short
term Apprenticeship Mismatch
Over-
education
Under-
education
SReform 0.0754** 0.0088 −0.0801*** −0.0525*** −0.0276
(2.34) (0.59) (−3.23) (−2.52) (−1.42)
AReform −0.0089 −0.0029 −0.0015 −0.0159 0.0143
(−0.33) (−0.29) (−0.05) (−0.49) (0.94)
SAReform −0.0380 −0.0159 0.0493* 0.0354 0.0138
(−0.96) (−1.15) (1.82) (1.48) (0.65)
Female 0.0377 −0.0306 −0.0441 −0.0448 0.0006
(0.89) (1.54) (−0.82) (−0.89) (0.03)
SReform Female −0.0854 0.0729 0.0535 0.0302 0.0540
(−1.29) (−0.52) (1.38) (0.42) (1.55)
AReform Female 0.0722 −0.0580 0.0795 0.0548 0.0246
(1.35) (−0.31) (1.30) (0.89) (0.62)
SAReform Female 0.0288 0.0427 −0.1048* −0.0395 −0.0653
(0.36) (1.33) (−1.79) (−0.70) (−1.29)
Constant 0.1183*** 0.0527*** 0.3191*** 0.2094*** 0.109***
(5.03) (6.36) (22.08) (14.64) (10.34)
N 59,259 59,259 N 59,259 59259 59259
R2 0.0108 0.0029 R2 0.0006 0.0016 0.0001
SReform Female (α + δ) −0.0099 −0.0063 R2 −0.0072 −0.0336 0.0264
(−0.20) (−0.29) R2 (−0.18) (−0.93) (0.95)
AReform Female (β + λ) 0.0632 −0.0087 R2 0.0779 0.0389 0.0390
(1.51) (−0.50) R2 (1.65) (0.95) (1.11)
SAReform Female (γ + θ ) −0.0092 0.0267 R2 −0.0554 −0.0040 −0.0514
(−0.16) (1.03) R2 (−1.12) (−0.09) (−1.19)
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All
regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level.
Regressions are weighted by firm size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics
for the group of female workers.
implementation of the reform and in which a trend variable and interacted
time and treated group dummies for all the periods before and after the
treatments are added, confirms the main results. This test shows a significant
effect for the year of the treatment, informing about the simultaneous impact
of the reform. Although a significant coefficient on mismatch is also observed
two years after the reform, the corresponding coefficient on over-education
is negative, but not statistically significant. Overall, these results point to a
robust short-term effect of the reform, while persistence in the medium term
is revealed to be weak (Table 11 in the online Appendix).
Heterogeneous Effects
(a) Males and females
Following recent research (Davia et al. 2017) which suggests that over-
education is more common among females as a consequence of the workers’
decisions to occupationally downgrade in order to achieve an improved work-
life balance, asymmetric effects by gender are explored (Table 9). While
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the apprenticeship reform did not have any effect on the relative flows
of temporary and mismatched workers, independent of gender, interesting
asymmetric effects are found for the short-term contract reform. First, an
increase in the relative flow of workers on short-term contracts ascribable
to the short-term contract reform is observed only among males, while
no effect of the reform on the relative flows of temporary female workers
is found. Second, in terms of mismatch, the short-term contract reform
significantly reduced the relative flow of over-educated workers by 5.2
percentage points only amongmen, with no effects among women. Hence, the
increased flexibility brought by the short-term contract reform was effective
in improving the quality of the matches, but among male workers only.
As explained by Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), this may be due to the
fact that women seek temporary employment for different reasons compared
to men. Women may more frequently self-select in non-screening types
of temporary employment compared to men because this better matches
their higher propensity to move on to non-market employment. Therefore,
this hypothesis could suggest that women in temporary employment ceteris
paribus may provide less effort than men, who are instead more likely to seek
career advancement.
(b) Young and older workers
Asymmetries among workers in the age group 15–24 (Table 10), which
according to the literature are disproportionately more likely to be hired
on temporary contracts (García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón 2011), are then
explored. On average, the relative flow of 15–24 young workers hired on both
short-term and apprenticeship contracts is higher by approximately 8.6 and
12.5 percentage points, compared to older workers. However, while the short-
term contract reform did not have any significant effect on the relative flows
of 15–24 years old workers hired on short-term or apprenticeship contracts, it
increased the relative flow of older workers hired on short-term contracts by
5.8 percentage points. There is weak evidence of the apprenticeship reform
reducing the relative flow of 15–24 years old workers hired on short-term
contracts by 7.6 percentage points, while increasing the same flow among
older workers by 4.2 percentage points. In firms exposed to both reforms,
the relative flow of older workers hired on short-term contracts decreased by
approximately 5.6 percentage points, while no effect was found for the 15–24
years old cohort.
In terms of mismatch, the coefficients of the change in mismatch flows
ascribable to the reforms are all statistically insignificant for the 15–24 years
old category. Nevertheless, the relative flow of over-educated older workers is
lower by 4.8 percentage points as a consequence of the short-term contract
reform, which confirms the general results reported in Table 8. Our findings
seem to suggest that the increased flexibility brought by the short-term
contract reform was beneficial for older workers in terms of reduced over-
education; however, younger workers were not significantly affected. Hence,
no evidence is found in support of the ‘waiting room effect’ hypothesis.
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TABLE 10
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows by Age Groups (15–24)
Short term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-
education
Under-
education
SReform 0.0589** 0.0068 −0.0574** −0.0488** −0.0085
(2.11) (0.50) (−2.39) (−2.27) (−0.49)
AReform 0.0420* 0.0040 0.0099 −0.0084 0.0183
(1.65) (0.35) (0.60) (−0.33) (1.21)
SAReform −0.0565* −0.0190 0.0277 0.0304 −0.0027
(−1.78) (−1.35) (1.30) (1.31) (−0.13)
Age 15–24 0.0868* 0.1248*** −0.0376 −0.0490 0.0167
(1.64) (5.26) (−1.31) (−1.04) (0.53)
SReform Age 15–24 −0.0521 0.0170 0.0210 0.0798 −0.0100
(−1.00) (0.58) (0.48) (0.73) (−0.29)
AReform Age 15–24 −0.1186** −0.0062 0.0387 0.0395 −0.0008
(−2.21) (−0.25) (0.94) (0.70) (−0.03)
SAReform Age 15–24 0.1327** 0.0202 −0.0434 −0.0381 −0.0053
(2.34) (0.55) (−0.86) (−0.66) (−0.13)
Constant 0.0612*** −0.0398*** 0.3100*** 0.1585*** 0.1044***
(4.46) (−5.49) (21.22) (14.49) (7.67)
N 59,259 59,259 59,259 59,259 59,259
R2 0.0085 0.1811 0.0016 0.0034 0.0011
SReform Age 15–24 (α + δ) 0.0067 0.0239 −0.0363 −0.0177 −0.0185
(0.16) (1.00) (−1.04) (−0.55) (−0.62)
AReform Age 15–24 (β + λ) −0.0765* −0.0022 0.0486 0.0311 0.0174
(−1.74) (−0.11) (1.35) (0.70) (0.62)
SAReform Age 15–24 (γ + θ ) 0.0762 0.0012 −0.0156 −0.0076 −0.0080
(1.53) (0.04) (−0.37) (−0.16) (−0.23)
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. All
regressions include time and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level.
Regressions are weighted by firm size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics
for the group of workers in the age group 15–24.
Moreover, no evidence is found of increased over-education imputable to the
role of short-term contracts as an instrument to absorb weaker and older
segments of the working population (Dekker et al. 2002).
The changes to the legislation brought by the apprenticeship reform were
multiple. In fact, as a consequence of the reform, workers are protected
by a minimum wage, which has been shown to reduce job turnover rates
(Portugal and Cardoso 2006) and, by making the apprenticeship contract
more expensive, could have pushed firms to become more selective. Moreover,
the age eligibility extension could have also lead older workers (25–29 years
old) to be hired as apprentices, potentially increasing the relative flow of over-
educated workers. To further investigate these effects, an additional analysis is
carried out by restricting the sample to firms which hire only workers below
the age of 29. Results show that the apprenticeship contract reform did not
have any significant effect neither on the relative flows of 15–29 workers on
temporary contracts nor on the relative flows of 15–29 mismatched workers
(Table 11). Moreover, when a triple difference-in-differences estimation is
performed to isolate the effects of the reforms on workers in the age category
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TABLE 11
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows (Sample of Firms Hiring Workers in the Age Range
15–29)
Short term Apprenticeship Mismatch Over-education Under-education
SReform 0.0364** 0.0024 −0.0176 −0.0159 −0.0017
(1.98) (0.21) (−0.17) (−1.02) (−0.02 )
AReform 0.0234 −0.0045 0.0730 0.0220 0.0510
(1.44) (−0.44) (0.86) (1.25) (0.64)
SAReform −0.0426* −0.0035 −0.0067 0.0057 −0.0730
(−1.88) (−0.30) (−0.65) (0.30) (−0.74)
Constant 0.0281*** −0.0440*** −0.0510*** 0.1001*** −0.1512***
(4.14) (6.50) (−1.50) (12.38) (−5.03)
N 48,280 48,280 48,280 48,280 48280
R2 0.0012 0.0028 0.0003 0.0015 0.0004
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels:* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. The
sample includes all firms which hire workers with age below 29. All regressions include time
and firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by
firm size.
15–24, all coefficients are statistically insignificant (Table 12). Among the
25–29 age group, the apprenticeship reform increased the relative flow of
workers hired on short-term contracts, with no effects on mismatch. Also, in
an environment of high flexibility, although the relative flow of 25–29 workers
hired on short-term contracts decreased, no effects are found on mismatch.
8. Conclusions
In this article, new light is shed on the relationship between EPL rigidity
and mismatch in dual labour economies, by focusing on the impact of two
labour market reforms approved in Italy in the early 2000s, which significantly
modified the rules for the utilization of short-term and apprenticeship
contracts. This research is important from a policy perspective as it provides
new insights on the role of temporary contracts in a domain which has been
so far little explored, such as qualification mismatch. The findings are mixed,
as important positive effects are found as a consequence of the short-term
contract reform, but no effect is found as a result of the apprenticeship
contract. The lack of any effect of the latter is potentially ascribable to the
opposite direction of the amendments: while the age eligibility extension
and the increased opportunities for the provision of training increased the
flexibility of the contract, the introduction of a minimum wage added an
additional restriction to the firms’ hiring decision. On the other hand, the
short-term contract reform which clearly increased the flexibility of the
contract lead to an improvement of the quality of the firm–worker matches.
The effect is found to be limited to older male workers, who have higher
chances to search for better jobs even when employed, increasing their
likelihood to find a perfect match. Women and younger workers, instead, who
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TABLE 12
Relative Employment and Mismatch Flows by Age Groups (Sample of Firms Hiring Workers in
the Age Range 15–29)
Short termApprenticeship Mismatch Over-educationUnder-education
SReform 0.0787 0.0093 0.0434 −0.0003 0.0437
(1.62) (0.62) (0.34) (−0.02) (0.34)
AReform 0.0431** 0.0030 0.0513 0.0318 0.0195
(2.21) (0.26) (0.74) (1.56) (0.30)
SAReform −0.0712** −0.0221 −0.0758 −0.0162 −0.0596
(−2.48) (−1.44) (−0.64) (−0.74) (−0.52)
Age 15–24 0.0787*** 0.2525*** 0.1765*** 0.0948*** 0.0817
(3.13) (13.30) (2.54) (4.79) (1.18)
SReform Age 15–24 −0.0070 0.0093 −0.2120 −0.0362 −0.1758
(−0.12) (0.31) (−1.01) (−0.82) (−0.87)
AReform Age 15–24 −0.0907** −0.0093 0.1188 −0.0412 0.1600
(−2.09) (−0.37) (0.59) (−0.89) (0.85)
SAReform Age 15–24 0.1014 0.0274 −0.0492 0.0578 −0.1070
(1.47) (0.74) (−0.19) (1.11) (−0.43)
Constant −0.0050 −0.0274*** −0.1883*** 0.0624*** −0.2508***
(−0.49) (−5.48) (−3.51) (5.98) (−5.08)
N 48,280 48,280 48,280 48280 48280
R2 0.0141 0.1728 0.0080 0.0320 0.0029
SReform Age 15–24 (α + δ) 0.0353 0.0186 −0.1686 −0.0365 −0.1321
(0.84) (0.79) (−1.04) (−1.05) (−0.86)
AReform Age 15–24 (β + λ) −0.0476 −0.0063 0.1701 −0.0093 0.1795
(−1.29) (−0.30) (0.79) (−0.24) (0.88)
SAReform Age 15–24 (γ + θ ) 0.0302 0.0053 −0.1250 0.0416 −0.1666
(0.54) (0.18) (−0.54) (0.94) (−0.77)
Note. t-Statistics in parentheses; significance levels:* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The
dependent variable is computed as the net flow of workers over the net employment flow. The
sample includes all firms which hire workers with age below 29. All regressions include time and
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at sector level. Regressions are weighted by firm
size. The last three rows report the coefficients and t-statistics for the group of workers in the age
group 15–24.
are the weakest segments of the population, were not significantly affected
by the enhanced labour market flexibility, potentially due to the different
rationale in their self-selection into temporary employment. This result comes
with the caveat of the effect being contemporaneous to the reform, with weak
evidence of persistence in the medium run.
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Notes
1. The law also introduced two additional forms of apprenticeship. Students between
the age of 15 and 18 can absolve their obligation in regular schools, by
participating to full-time vocational courses, or through apprenticeships (type I). In
addition, the ‘high-apprenticeship’ allows young individuals (age 18–29) to obtain
a secondary- or tertiary-level education degree (bachelor’s or master’s degree)
through apprenticeship (type III). The first type of apprenticeshipwas implemented
in Veneto after 2007 (ISFOL 2009). The ‘high apprenticeship’ was experimentally
implemented in Veneto in the same sectors in which the collective agreements were
renewed. Four masters’ degrees were instituted, of which two terminated in 2007
and two in 2008 (ISFOL 2010). Due to the small number of apprentices involved
(37 students), the focus is on the vocational apprenticeship contract.
2. The classification of treated and control sectorsmay be subject to amisclassification
problem, as the renewal of agreements has been implemented at micro-sector level
and it is difficult to collect information about all the collective agreements in
the period considered. However, the classification of Cappellari et al. (2012) and
Albanese et al. (2017) is used, the identification strategy has been discussed with
the authors and the same sources have been used. Themisclassification error should
therefore be minimal and confined to a limited number of observations.
3. The size of the attrition is difficult to compute as the workers who move away from
Veneto are not observed and the institutionwhich provides the data does not release
such information. However, using the administrative employer–employee Veneto
Worker History dataset (Card et al. 2014), which covers the universe of firms and
workers in Veneto until 2001, the attrition rate is computed to be 3 per cent in 1998–
2001.
4. These data are distributed by Bureau vanDjik, and are available from 1995 onwards
for all corporate (non-financial) firms with annual turnover above € 500,000.
5. A direct comparison with the results of Cappellari et al. (2012) is not possible:
first, data representative of a single Italian region are used, while their results are
based on the Italian firms population; second, the identification strategy used in
this article cannot take advantage of the variation in the implementation of the
apprenticeship reform at regional level; third, the definition of turnover in this
article is not computed using the stocks of workers.
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